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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
EAST BENCH IRRIGATION CO., 
et al. Respondents, 
vs. No. 7990 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. 
Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The importance of the decision of the Court to be 
rendered in this case, must be apparent. The large num-
ber of parties involved, the huge investments and expend.i.: 
tures at stake, and the fact that the decision in this case 
will be far-reaching and may affect litigation upon other 
rivers within the State of Utah, cannot be over-
emphasized. This Court has recognized the importance 
of the case and the issues involved when it acted upon 
the suggestion that it traverse the Sevier River and visu-
alize the physical conditions existing on the stream and 
properties which will be affected by the final determina-
tion. 
If the respondents are able to succeed in sustaining 
the decree appealed from, the appellants urge that we 
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2 
will have in U tab an entirely ne'v concept of 'vater law, 
adjudicated water rights on major rivers of the State 
will be jeopardized, and the status of such adjudicated 
rights will be thrown into helpless confusion. 
Appellants have endeavored by their answer to the 
respondents' contentions as set forth in this reply brief 
to aid this Court in determining what are the real and 
important issues to be decided, and to place such issues 
in their proper perspective. 
As nearly as we can determine from respondents' 
brief, they seek to sustain the judgment of the trial court 
on three· grounds : 
1. (A) That the appellants have no vested right 
in the return flow of the Sevier River, or in the waters 
going to make up the return flow, so that they can have 
no valid objection to respondents converting a direct flow 
winter right to a storage right for later irrigation, and 
that appellants have no right to a continuation of the 
conditions which existed on the stream at the tin1e their 
appropriations were made. (Pages 7, 17, 19, 41, 57, 72, 75, 
92, 128 and 139 respondents' brief) 
(B) That all waters passing the Kingston Gaug-
ing Station, which have been decreed to the respond-
ents, have come to the appellants gratuitously from the 
respondents or as waste water as a result of disastrous 
conditions upstream and particularly that the appellant 
storage con1panies have no vested rights in any winter 
flow at the Kingston Gauging Station. ·(Page 7 respond-
ents' brief) 
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2. That appellants would still get their water by 
reason of the saving of 30,000 acre feet of water which 
annually wastes by evaporation on 10,000 acres of water-
logged lands belonging to respondents. (Pages 9 and 10 
respondents' brief) 
3. That even though the water is taken from ap-
pellants and given to respondents, appellants could not 
be hurt because the amount taken is so small in relation 
to the whole. (Page 10 respondents' brief) 
Wholly aside from the n1ain contention of the 
respondents, the preliminary statement contains several 
glaring misstatements of fact. At page 8 of respondents' 
brief is contained this statement: 
"In approving the change applications, the 
district court fully protected the rights of defend-
ants by the conditions specified in the judgment. 
By the express terms of the judgment approving 
the change applications, the court requires the 
plaintiffs to allow the same quantity of water to 
pass the Kingston measuring station in the future 
as has passed that station in prior comparable 
years of similar conditions of water shed, snow 
cover, rainfall, infiltration runoff, te1nperature, 
and other pertinent factors so that the yield of 
the river at Kingston will be the same as if no 
change applications had been approved, except 
that the court does not require the plantiffs to 
send down the river to Kingston any water gratui-
tously or as waste water." 
'rhe above statement is not in accordance with fact. 
What the court did was to permit the respondents to 
store the entire flow of the river at Hatch up to 74 sec-
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ond feet during the period from November 15th to ~farch 
15th of each year with the only provision being that dur-
ing the time of such storage, respondents \Vere not also 
to use a like quantity for irrigation. 
lA. THE APPELLANTS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT IN 
THE RETURN FLOW AND TO THE CONTINUANCE OF 
THE CONDITIONS WHICH RESULT IN SUCH RETURN 
FLOW. 
At page 92 of their brief respondents state that: 
"The Cox decree does not give any of the 
appellants any vested right in the return flo"~ 
resulting from the method of irrigation by plain-
tiffs and the statement on page 51 (of appellants 
brief) that 'the lower users have a vested right 
which compels the continuation of the past prac-
tices of respondents using the water and not stor-
ing or holding it up' is not based on any language 
of the Cox decree. Such statement is also contrary 
to law." (Emphasis added) 
This question of whether or not the appellants have a 
vested right in the return flow or carrier water resulting 
from the lTSE of respondents winter rights upon their 
lands, is one of the fundamental issues of law at stake 
in this case. The Trial Court erroneously decided that 
the appellants did not have any vested right in such 
return flow and thus gave judicial sanction to respond-
ents' clairn that they could take both their decreed stun-
rner and winter water rights "and such water rnay be 
taken in a bucket and dumped into the Colorado RivPr" 
if respondents so decided. 
The decreed rights as provided in the ( iox deeree 
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exceed the flo\v of the Sevier 1-\iver at any one point a 
hundred fold. Everyone living along the Sevier River is 
well a.\vare of the fact that at many places there are tight 
darns across the river which divert the entire flow of the 
river into a canal and that for a short distance below 
such darn, the river is completely dry. Thus it is obvious 
that each 'vater user is entirely dependent for his source 
of supply upon the return flow of the upper user. If this 
Court should lend any credence to the argun1ent that a 
lower user does not have a vested right in such return 
flo\v and in a continuation of the conditions which pro-
duce such return flow then the lower users' decreed right 
will be \vorthless. The principle of return flow is re-
sponsible for the utilization of the waters of the Sevier 
River over and over again. 
When the respondents argue that appellants have no 
vested right in the return flow of the Sevier River, it is 
equivalent to their admitting that the change applications 
will result in adversely affecting the rights of the lower 
users, because it is obvious that if respondents \vere sure 
that the record is clear and satisfactory, and this Court 
would be convinced thereby that appellants could not be 
injured by these change applications either through 
dilninishing the amount of water which theretofore had 
reached appellants, or changing the time element of the 
return flow, then respondents need not so laboriously 
argue that the appellants have no vested right to a con-
tinuance of the return flow. 
The respondents say in effect that since the appel-
lants have no vested right to a continuation of the return 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
flow as it is now and has heretofore existed, they can 
do as they please with the water, "carry it away in 
buckets" or otherwise dispose of it. If respondents are 
serious about this contention and expect this Court to 
adopt this.new concept of water law, then why all of their 
lengthy and reiterated statements set forth in their brief 
that appellants· cannot suffer any injury, but that the 
storage of water in the Hatchtown Reservoir will pass 
more water down through the Kingston gauging station 
than under present conditions. 
Th~ rights of appropriators along the entire length 
of the Sevier River, excepting at the extreme headwaters 
thereof, are dependent upon return flow-more so than 
on any other stream within the State so far as we have 
been able to determine. Defendants' Ex. 54, is a lTnited 
States Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper, and has 
been compiled after years of study. Concerning the 
Sevier River and its water supply, at pages 68 and 69 
is found the following statement: 
·"It was apparent soon after the irrigation 
use of the Sevier began that much of the water 
diverted from the stream and applied to con-
tiguous land soon found its way back into the 
river .. This fact is of prime importance, to the 
users of the stream because the return water is 
available for rediversion at places lower down the 
river. So 1na.rked is this tendency to return seep-
age that not far below several tight dams that 
divert the entire flow of the river at its normal 
state the river carries nearly as much water, and 
in some instances fully as tnuch as it does above 
the dams. Tlus has at tin1es reversed the general 
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rule that the upper irrigators on a stream have 
the best water supply, for a number of canals 
belo\v points 'vhere large diversions are made 
have a water supply from return flow that can 
be materially decreased only by diverting the 
water above to another watershed or to land so 
remote as to change the regimen of tha.t flow. On 
the other hand, it has complicated water rights. 
along the stream, because it results in no known 
quantity of water to be divided along those 
stretches of river between the gauging stations. 
The present ~irrigation practice, however, by yea,rs 
of application under natural drainage conditions, 
has brought abo~tt a divertible water-supply yiel.d 
along the river greatly in excess of the observed 
flow at the gauging stations. This is not only true 
of the river as whole but is generally true of all 
e~cept one of the respective stretches between the 
gauging stations." (Italics ours) 
lB. THE APPELLANTS HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGH'T 
THAT THE WATERS PASSING KINGSTON GAUGING STA-
TION CONTINUE TO DO SO AT THE TIME AND IN THE 
QUANTITY AS IN PAST YEARS. THE SO-CALLED WIN-
TER WATER PASSING THE KINGSTON STATION IS THE 
VERY SUBSTANCE OF THE STORAGE RIGHTS OF PIUTE 
AND SEVIER BRIDGE RESERVOIRS. 
The court apparently took the position that there 
could be no vested rights, upon the part of the appellant · 
storage companies, in winter water. Respondents took 
the position that this so-called winter right, which they 
have never used in the past has gone to the lower users 
gratuitously. Respondents, by their own testimony 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. G, reproduced at page 20-21 of Appel-
lant's Brief) show that for the ten year period of 1940 
to 1949, inclusive, during the months of October, N ovem-
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ber, December, January, February, March and April, the 
· flow of the river at Kingston greatly exceeds the flow 
at Hatch and during the months of May, June, July, 
August and September, the flow at Hatch greatly exceeds 
the flow at Kingston. The same condition has existed 
for many years. (Defendants Ex. 54, Flow at Hatch, 
pages 217-220; Flow at Kingston, pages 225-229.) The 
decreased flow at Kingston coincides exactly with the 
irrigation season and the increased flow at Kingston 
coincides exactly with the non-irrigation season, as such 
seasons generally occur within the State of Utah. 
We believe that it is proper for this Court, in this 
present action, to take judicial notice of the fact that 
the only. winter irrigation which occurs in th~ high 
altitude of the irrigated lands of Utah is done from 
the witness chair and not in actual practice. This Court is 
no more bound by such statements than it would be bound 
if some witness should state that the sun shown on a 
certain spot in Utah continuously for a twenty-four hour 
period. Each of the members of this Court has lived 
within the State of Utah for many years and has had the 
opportunity to observe irrigation p·ractices within this 
state, and we venture the statement without fear of con-
tradiction that no member of this Court has ever observed 
or known of any farmer irrigating continuously and 
regularly during the winter months-particularly at a 
point where the elevation is approximately six thousand 
feet and the night time temperatures frequently reach 
the upper 20's below zero. An upper water user is not 
gratuitously giving water to another which he cannot 
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divert from the strean1 al)d put to any ben~ficial use f~r 
irrigation purposes, particularly when the practice haa 
gone on for n1ore than eighty years continuously, and the 
lower user along the strear~~:_ has appropriated, stor~~ 
and used the water for a long period of time. This is 
true even tho some court decree has previonsiy award~d 
the water to an upper user. 
The only way in which winter water can be "Qene- · 
ficially used for irrigation purposes in this altitude is to 
store the same in a reservoir during the winter months 
and use it for irrigation purposes during the gro,ving 
season. The respondents say, in effect, that for the past 
eighty years they have permitted this water to flow down 
to the lower users in the winter time but that during all 
of such tin1e it was a mere gift to such lower users, in 
which they could acquire no rights -by appropriation or 
otherwise because the water belonged absolutely to 
respondents; that now respondents desire to construct a 
reservoir and use this water; that they have a right to 
do this for the reason they are the absolute owners of 
the water and may· do with it what they please; that even 
tho they could make no beneficial use of the water them-
selves they could hold the ownership of it indefinitely 
and at any time construct a reservoir so that they could 
then use it; that they could construct this reservoir and 
deprive the lower users of the use of the water even tho 
such lower users have appropriated, stored and used 
the water continuously for irrigation p-urposes. for more 
than thirty years last past. 
Such a contention is not the law in the State of Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
The appropriator acquires only the right to the USE of 
water, and he acquires no rights in any water which he 
cannot and does not beneficially use. Were this not the 
fact there could have been no irrigation development 
within the State of Utah, because all of the early decrees 
awarded to small groups the use of waters on a stream 
far in excess of their actual needs, and if they had 
actually owned the water, a small group on any streau1 
could have prevented any further development along 
that stream. But even if the upper appropriators had' 
actually owned the water they could not have done what 
the respondents are now seeking to do. The doctrine of 
Equitable Estoppel would have prevented the1n fron1 tak-
ing back the water which they have allowed others to use 
over a long period of time for the development of agri-
cultural lands and the establishment of fanns, homes and 
communities. 
The chief argument of respondents in support of their 
position is that the appellant storage companies have no 
vested rights whatever in any winter flow of water for 
storage purposes, and that they have only a vested right 
to such water as may accumulate in their reservoirs at 
the sufferance of the direct flow users. This argu1nent 
i:s repeated again and again. What the respondents 
choose to overlook is the fact that the storage rights and 
the primary rights are predicated upon and awarded by 
the sa1ne decree, and upon the sa1ne stipulation of the 
parties upon which the decree was based. The storage 
filings of the appellant reservoir co1npanies as stated in 
the decree, and as a matter of law, have the sa1ne dignity 
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as direct flow rights. The trial court apparently took the 
position that a 'vater filing and a decree of the court con-
firming it, for the purpose of storing the direct flow of 
the river in a reservoir, does not constitute a vested 
right, and that the upper users could diminish the flow 
of the river by the construction of a reservoir and 
impounding a portion of that flow therein without in 
any 1uanner interfering with the vested rights of the 
lo,ver storage co1npanies. The trial court admitted in his 
memorandum of decision that this reasoning was weak 
(R. 1121), 'vhich admission is certainly a classic under-
statement. To hold that vested rights can be acquired in 
the flow of a strea1n for use of the waters thereof by 
direct diversion but that no vested right can be acquired 
in the flow of a 'Stream by appropriating the same for 
storage in a reservoir during the winter months for the 
purpose of irrigation during the irrigating season, leads 
to an absurdity. Especially is this true when we take 
into consideration the nature of the direct diversion of 
appellants, particularly along the Sevier River. The 
direct apropriator merely selected some suitable site on 
the river and f~lled a couple of cottonwood trees across 
the strean1, hauling a few loads of rock, and dumping 
the sarne behind the felled trees and thus diverted the 
water into his canals. This type of diversion of the direct 
flow rights is still common along the Sevier River and 
until recent years was a universal method of diversion. 
The storage cornpanies were required to 'Spend huge 
sun•~ of rnoney, running into the millions of dollars, in 
order to construct the reservoirs required to impound 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
and divert the water. What the reservoir companies 
appropriated by their filings was not such 'vater as 
might accumulate in the reservoir, but a definite quantity 
of water flowing in second feet to be impounded in the 
reservoirs so constructed. ·The holding of the trial court 
and the argument. of respondents, to the effect that an 
upper user may not, by the construction of a reservoir 
diminish the flo'v of \Vater that the lower primary or 
direct flow users have received for a long period of time, 
but that they can, by the construction of such reservoir, 
and with impunity, diminish the flow of the river which 
the storage companies have received for a similar period 
of tin1e, is not based upon any :sound reasoning. Any 
judgment based upon weak reasoning or unsound .princi-
ples invariably results in bad law which sooner or later 
1nust he reversed. Under the statutes of Utah and the 
prior decisions of this Court, each type of appropriation, 
both direct flow and storage, have equal dignity and 
there is no rhyme or reason to the argument that the 
storage rights can be interfered with and diminished but 
that the direct flow rights cannot. 
The rights ot the owners of the Piute Reservoir and 
the owners of the Sevier Bridge Reservoir are set forth 
under their specific filings and applications which appear 
on Pages 185 and 186 of the Cox Decree. These rights 
are specifically !set forth on Page 185 of the Decree as 
follows: 
~'It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the l"liute Reservoir and Irrigation Co1npany, 
a corporation, State Board of I.Jand Con1n1is-
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s1oners of the State of Utah, (herein called the 
o'vners of Piute R-eservoir) ; and the Abraham 
Irrigation Con1pany, a corporation, Deseret Irri-· 
gation Co1npa.ny, a corporation, Delta Canal Com-
pany, a corporation, Central Utah Water Com-
pany, a corporation, and Melville Irrigation Com-
pany; a corporation, (herein called the owners of 
the Sevier Bridge Reservoir), are the owners of 
the right to store and use all of the waters yielded 
by the said Sevier River for sati:sfying their 
rights under applications designated as No-. 296, 
1nade ~{arch 14, 1905; No. 1534, made A1:1gust 16, 
.1907; and No. 1624, made October 21, 1907; in the 
office of the State Engineer of the State of Utah 
and under the so-called Hawley Filing made by 
Jacob C. Hawley on August 26, 1902, and under 
applications to appropriate water designated as 
No. 1367 A, made May 10, 1907; No. 1367 A-1, 
made ~fay 10, 1907; and No. 4562, made ~larch 19, 
1912 ; in the office of the State Engineer of the 
State of Utah." 
At page 71 of their brief, respondents pounce upon 
a "catch-all" phrase in the Cox Decree, appearing at page 
195 thereof, and treat that as the sole rights of the 
storage companies. Naturally any water captured and 
held in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir and the Piute Reser-
voir which otherwise would have gone to waste, belongs 
to these companies, but in addition to that they do have 
definite and specific rights herein shown, and respondents 
are no more entitled to diminish those rights by the con-
struction of the Hatchtown Reservoir than they are 
entitled to diminish the rights of the lower direct flow 
users. Respondents state at page 71 of their brief as· 
follows: 
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"The decree refers to water in excess of pri4 
mary rights. It does not refer to consumptive use 
of water, nor does it purport to vest in the reser-
voir companies any 'water in excess of consump4 
tive use' made by the respondents." 
and imply therefron1 in their argument that they may at 
this late date, to the· detriment of the storage co1npanies, 
change their winter rights from a non-consumptive use 
to a consumptive use. Had the decree made such a pro~ 
vision it would have been invalid as contrary to public 
policy and would have been contrary to the well estab4 
lished law that a prior appropriator cannot change his 
use from a non-consumptive use to a consun1ptive use to 
the detriment of a subsequent appropriator. Certainly 
it could not be argued that any of the power companies 
"\vhich have now appropriated water for the purpose of 
generating electric power, could, if atomic power or son1e 
other cheaper means of power should be discovered and 
developed, change their non-consumptive power use to 
a consumptive use for agricultural purposes, depriving 
the lower users on the stream of these same 'vaters 'vhich 
the lower users have appropriated for irrigation pur4 
poses. But that is exactly what respondents try to argue 
in the present case. It was established beyond any ques-
tion of a doubt that the present and past usage of the 
'vinter waters by the respondents has been lin1ited in 
scope, and the use has been largely non-consumptive; 
that after the diversion, the water returned to the natural 
channel of the Sevier River practically undiiuinished and 
flowed do,vn to make up the storage rights of appellants 
who have appropriated and used the sa1ne for n1ore than 
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thirty years last past for agricultural purposes. Respond-
ents claim the right to change this use of water from a 
non-consu1nptive to a consumptive use by storing such 
winter waters in the proposed Hatch Reservoir and 
using the same during the summer months on the five 
thousand acres of additional land where the waters will 
be practically all consumed. If such a doctrine should be 
upheld, then the power companies in the west, if some 
additional source of power were developed, could compel 
the 'vater users within such areas to repurchase their 
water rights from the power companies or be deprived 
of water which they had, for generations, appropriated 
and used for agricultural purposes. 
Even if the whole source of supply of the reservoir 
companies was based upon the "catch-all" phrase in the 
Cox Decre·e, it would offer no help to respondents because 
the word "accumulation," as used in the Cox Decree, has 
been defined by this Court in the case of Richlands I rr. 
Co. vs. Westview Irr. Co., et al., 96 Utah 403, 80 Pac. 2nd 
458. This Honorable Court defined the word accumulate 
as follows: 
"We must judicially know that the water in a 
river between any two points is not accumulated 
there solely from the contributions thereto from 
marginal sources, but that the major portion 
thereof comes by natural flow from upstream 
sources which have fed the channel itself, step by 
step, clear back to its ultimate source or sources. 
The entire watershed to its uttermost confines, 
covering thousands of square miles, out to the 
crest of the divides which separate it from adja-
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cent watersheds, is the generating source from 
which the water of a river comes or accumulates 
in its channel. Rains and snows falling on this 
entire vast area sink into the soil and find their 
way by surface or underground flow or percola-
tion through the sloping strata down to the cen-
tral channel. This entire sheet of water, or water 
table, constitutes the river and it never ceases to 
be such in its centripetal motion toward the chan-
nel. Any appropriator of water from the eentral 
channel is entitled to rely and depend upon all 
the sources which feed the main stream above his 
own diversion point, clear back to the farthest 
· limits of the watershed. 
"Webster's definitions of 'accumulate' as 
meaning 'to heap up in a mas'S; to pile up; collect 
or bring together; to amass; gather, store up, 
aggregate, hoard', etc., imply no restriction as to 
the source, means or methods of the accumulation. 
A fruit tree accumulates water and nourishment 
from the earth by means of every one of its 
thousands of roots and rootlets spreading in 
every direction, and every apple or peach on the 
tree i's an accumulation or reservoir of that mois-
ture and nutrition, owing naught to any one 
source n1ore than to another. The whole crop of 
fruit on each tree is the 'yield' of that tree. The 
entire yield of an orchard is the 'accumulation' of 
moisture and nourishment taken by all the trees 
from the ground by all (not merely some) of the 
roots which tap the source of supply in the ground 
covered by the orchard. The same principle ap-
plies to a field of grain nourished, produced and 
yielded by. all its individual stalks and myriads of 
r~ots and rootlets which suck up moisture and 
~utrition from the ground. Every one of its root.s 
are a point of contact with the source of supply, 
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not merely some of t:P.em, or those near the 
margin of the field." 
Respondents contend (page 51 of their brief) tP.at 
the cases of Lasso·n vs. Seely, (Utah ~951) ~38 Pac. 2nd 
418, and Srnithfield West Bench Irr. Co. vs. Union Cenr 
tral Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 Pac. 2nd 866, dis-
pose of the arguments and claims of the ~ppellants. If 
the facts in the case at bar were comparable, and if the 
legal principles relied upon by respondents. to sustain 
their position were the same and the only legal principles 
involved in this case, there would be merit in such con-
tention. On Pages 49, 50 and 51 of the appellants' brief, 
appellants distinguish between the factual situation and 
legal principles involved in these two cases and the case 
at bar, the principle distinguishing feature being that 
the above two cases concerned summertime practices and 
waters which were awarded the litigants for :summer use. 
There was not involved in either of these cases the prob· 
lem · o~ conversion of direct flow winte~· water into 
storage rights. The waste water referred to in the L·as-
son and West Bench cases was water discharged as waste 
out of waters used on land during the times for which 
the appropriators were awarded the use thereof. In 
' . ' 
other words, an appropriator having a vested right to 
the use of water during certain summer months· may pre-
vent waste water from leaving his premises and may 
re-use it during such summer months, but we have. found 
no case or authority holding that an appropriator may, 
as against lower and junior appropriators, hold. water 
. ., 
which he cannot beneficially use during the period for 
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which the use was awarded, for the use at some future 
time outside the period for which the use was awarded, 
and particularly for use during a period when the appro-
priator has another and additional water right for the 
same. premises. Put another way, if the respondents 
desire to prevent what they call waste water, ( fro1n and 
out of their winter water), from leaving their premises, 
and can beneficially re-use it on their premises during 
such winter months, the doctrine announced in the cases 
relied on by respondents might be urged with greater 
force. 
It is true that in the Smithfield West Ben.ch case the 
Court states in its decision "while in his ditch or upon 
his land it (the water) was his property and he could USi 
it as he saw fit. When the water reaches the lower end 
of his land, he may again gather it into a ditch and con-
vey it to any other land, ditch or reservoir." Obviously, 
if the appropriator gathered the water into a ditch or 
canal, it would be re-used immediately and not held for 
storage until the following year or even until the fol-
lowing weeks or months. When the Court stated "he 
may again gather it and convey it to a reservoir," we 
are convinced the Court did not have in mind a reservoir 
such as that contemplated by respondents-1niles up-
streal? from the place where the premises to be irrigated 
are located, nor did the Court have in mind impow1ding 
what "might be" waste water before the water is even 
used, let alone, wasted-nor impounding water a\varded 
for winter use to be used months thereafter during smn-
mer irrigation. 
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And while the concurring opinion of :hfr. Chief Justice 
'Volfe in the case of Lassou vs. Seely, supra, states "the 
defendant is entitled to cultivate his own lands in such 
a manner as to utilize the water to which he is entitled," 
it is assun1ed that the \Vater was going to be utilized 
during the period for which it was awarded, and in the 
mann.er and for the purpose for which it was awarded. 
Certainly the language used by Chief Justice Wolfe is 
not to be interpreted as meaning the. water could be 
utilized without any limitation as to time of future use, 
or manner thereof, for a purpose different from that for 
which it was awarded. (It should be borne in mind that 
respondents justify the award for winter use for the 
purpose of "storing water in the ground, to take the frost 
out of the ground, to produce early feed, to wash out the 
alkali and also for culinary and stockwatering"). (See 
pages 35 and 59 of respondents' brief.) 
It was further stated by Chief Justice Wolfe "the 
decree does not compel any upper appropriator to waste 
water nor to leave a surplus of water to drain into the 
slough. Nor could the decree direct the upper ·appro-
priators as to how they should utilize the waters which 
they are entitled to use." But this language from which 
the respondents derive such comfort, applies to the 
circumstances and actual situation then before the Court. 
The Cox Decree sets forth during what period the 
respondents shall have their winter water and it cer-
tainly implies a use of the water during that period, not 
six months later. 
Respondents' entire theory seems to be that they 
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want to impound in the proposed Batchtown Reservoir 
water which they designate as "waste" or "gratuitous" 
water. This so-called waste or gratuitous water is largely 
water which heretofore respondents have either per-
mitted to come down the river channel in the winter 
months when they had no use therefor, or water which 
they have run over their lands, and having little or no 
consumptive use, immediately found its way back into 
the channel. This kind or class of water is not "waste" 
water as that term is understood and intended when 
subject to co1nment or discussion by the courts. It 
is a n1isnon1er to call it "waste water," or water 
"gratuitously" given up. It is water which the respond-
ents cannot beneficially use and they cannot hold back, 
notwithstanding the decree awards to them a specific 
amount of water. Appellants have no objection, and 
offer none, to respondents holding this water on their 
lands, if they can, for use or re-use during the winter 
months. As a matter of fact respondents have never 
gratuitously permitted the water to leave their lands 
when they' could hold and use it. What respondents seek 
to do is impound what they call "waste" water before it 
is even used in the first instance and before it becotnes 
"wasted", and to impound what they are pleased to call 
"gratuitous" 'vater before it even reaches their premises. 
The Cox Decree certainly never intended any such 
result, and it cannot be said that when the parties stipu-
lated the Cox Decree they had any such changed condi-
tions in mind. 
At pages 86, 87 and 88 of respondents' brief, they 
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complain that the appellants want to go back of the Cox 
decree when referring to the proposed determination 
(Ex. 52), copies of water claims filed by plaintiffs upon 
which the proposed detern1ination was largely formu-
lated (Ex. 53) and negotiations of the parties prior to 
the decree (R. 857-858-891), to reduce the water rights 
of respondents. They cite the case of Richlands Irriga-
tion Co. vs. Westview Irrigation Co. et al., 96 Utah 403, 
80 P~c. 2nd 458, as authority for their position. It is 
true that this Court held in such case "when all parties 
agree on the rights of the claimant and stipulate that a 
decree may be entered in conformity thereto, the objec-
tion does not lie that the relief given exceeds the state-
ment of claim." The Court actually held in that ~ase that 
water users' claims previously filed were not controlling 
when contrary to. the stipulation and decree. But it 
appears conclusively that the stipulation in question 
expressly provided for use of water from Jan. 1st to 
Dec. 31st of each year, and there was no room for inter-
pretation. But when a decree is stipulated· and t}:le 
parties are divided as to the interl;lretation of a portion 
or portions thereof, or as to what the decreed and vested 
rights are, and ther~ exists possible uncertainty as to 
the construction which should be given to ~he disputed 
portions, then the court should look · to the proposed 
determination, water users' claims theretofore filed and 
any other extrinsic evidence available. As examples of 
divergent views of the litigants as to correct interpTe-
tation of the decree: 
(Page 66 respondents' brief where it is said) : 
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''The decree appealed fron1 will be searched in 
vain for any 'definition and determination' of 
the vested rights of any of the parties." 
(Page 92 respondents' brief where it is said): 
"Contrary to the argmnent on page 53 (appel-
lants' brief) the Cox decree does not give any of 
appellants any vested right in the return f}o,v, 
etc." 
We call attention to the case of Smithfield West BencJt 
lrr. Co. vs. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356, 
195 Pac. 2nd 249, wherein it is held "A stipulation 
entered into by parties to suit must be construed in 
light of the situation at the time of its execution." 
Respondents' second contention is, namely, that apel-
lants will not be injured by the construction of the Hatch-
town Reservoir and the impounding therein of 'vaters 
which has otherwise gone to the appellants, for the 
reason that there will be a saving of 30,000 acre feet of 
water now \vasted by evaporation on 10,000 acres of 
waterlogged lands. They contend these savings 'vill go 
to appellants and thus more than offset any losses which 
they would sustain by reason of the construction of the 
Hatchtown Reservoir and the impounding of the "'inter 
and early spring flow therein which has heretofore gone 
down to the appellant storage companies. This is an 
argument that respondents dwell upon at great length-
one that they really love, for in their brief they havP 
repeated it in detail no fewer than sixteen ti1nes. The 
argument appears at pages 9, 10, 22, 23, 29, 30, 33, 37~ 
53, 54, 62, 64, 73, 77, 78, 125, 132, and 134. They evidently 
believe in· the late Adolph Hitler's theory, that if you 
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repeat a falsehood often enough it will eventually be 
accepted as the truth. 
It must be remembered that these applications do 
not seek to abandon the use of the water on any of the 
waterlogged lands and apply the same on new lands. 
What twenty of these applications are designed to do is 
to hold back the application of water on these water-
logged lands in 'vinter months and the early spring when 
evaporation is at a minimum and apply the same 
quantity of water on the same waterlogged lands later 
in the season when evaporation losses are at a maximum. 
The other applications are designed to use a portion of 
the early spring and late fall rights for the irrigation of 
five thousand acres of entirely new land. Respondents 
desire to store winter and early spring flow, which they 
do not need and for which they have heretofore made 
no claim, for irrigation purposes on this new land. Thus, 
in effect, they will use their present supply for the irri-
gation of the new lands and use the stored water on their 
present waterlogged lands in the heat of the summer 
when the rate of evaporation is at its maximum. The 
change applications, if allowed, thus would increase, 
rather than decrease, the loss by evaporation on the 
10,000 acres of water-logged lands. 
It is probably true, as stated by Dr. Israelson, that 
a considerable saving in water could be made in evapora-
tion losses and otherwise, if proper farming and irriga-
tion practices were followed, that is, if the waterlogged 
lands were drained and the present vegetation was de-
stroyed and the lands were then planted to tame grasses 
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and forage, il.nd then irrigated with sUfficient water to 
supply the tame grasses and forage. It is a theory that 
has some interesting possibilities, but the trouble with 
the situation is that it is only theory and not a practice. 
There is not, in the decree of the trial court, a single 
requirement that any of the respondents use a single 
acre foot iess water on the waterlogged lands than they 
have used on such lands in_the past. There is no require-
ment providing for the drainage of even a single acre 
of the 10,000 acres of waterlogged lands and there is 
absolutely no limitation placed upon the quantity of 
water that can be used on such waterlogged ·lands. Had 
the decree provided that re~pondents must drain these 
10,000 waterlogged. acres, then plant them to tame 
grass-es and forage and limit the amount of water 'vhich 
c.ould then be applied to the maximum needs of such 
tame grasses, the respondents would have loudly and 
. . I , 
violently objected to such provisions. Such waterlogged 
lands are meadow lands and produce ' an abundance of 
native yegetation, and used by respo~dents for grazing 
purposes. It is true that this type of native vegetation 
~s not the most efficient insofar as the acreage yield is 
concerned. It is not, as Dr. Israelson stated, of the 
highest palatability for livestock but it is nevertheless 
of sufficient palatability so that cattle thrive on it, raise 
their calves, and gain back the loss of weight suffered 
during th~. wint~r months. These waterlogged lands 
are in reality meadow lands and form t}.l.e very basis of 
respondents' livestock industry, and no doubt furnish 
them a higher net return for investment and labor tltan 
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any other lands used by then1 for farming and raising 
of livestock. 
The last thing on this earth that respondents desire, 
is to have these meadow or waterlogged grass lands 
drained, "\Vith the requirement that SUCh acreage be 
planted and irrigated as farm lands. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that there wa.s a public offer 
made by the United State Army Engineers, a branch of 
the United States Government, (of which offer this 
Court 1nay take judicial notice), to go into the lower end 
of Circle 'r alley and without expense to the respondents 
deepen the natural channel of the s.evier River from a 
point below the Kingston Gauging Station to a point 
above the Town of Circleville. This deepening of the 
natural channel of the Sevier River would have had the 
effect of naturally draining several thousand acres of 
this so-called waterlogged land. The people of Circle-
ville, in no uncertain terms, turned down the proffer of 
the United States Army Engineers, even though the 
entire cost of the project would have been borne by the 
Federal Government. 
If respondents are at all sincere in their contention 
that the construction of the Hatchtown Reservoir would 
result in the saving of 30,000 acre feet of water now 
entirely lost by evaporation, they would have suggested 
to the court a provision in the decree to the effect: 
"that storage, diversion or use of the waters 
referred to in such applications shall be so con. 
trolled that in each calendar month the flow of 
the South Fork of the Sevier River past the 
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Kingston gauging station shall be in that quantity 
of water which would have passed such station 
in the same calendar month had there been no 
storage, diversion or use within said applica-
tions." 
Certainly, in all fairness, respondents should have 
had no objection to the same formula being applied to 
the water measured at the Kingston gauging station in 
the non-irrigating season as is applied during the irri-
gating season. They should have had no valid objection 
to having the same formula applied with respect to the 
vested rights of the primary users and storage users 
below the Kingston gauging station. The saving of 
30,000 acre feet of water would be sufficient to fill the 
proposed reservoir more than two and a half times and 
that saving alone would provide respondents with a 
fairly adequate water supply on their limited acres of 
farm land for the short growing season which exists at 
Circleville and Panguitch. Particularly this would be 
true, if the situation is as stated by respondents in their 
brief (page 54), as follows: 
"Even if the figure of 13,000 acre feet used 
by the appellants 'vere accepted as the a1nount of 
water which would be consumptively used on the 
5000 acres (including the amount lost by evapora-
tion plus the loss in transit) there would still lw 
a surplus of approximately 17,000 acre feet rP-
sulting from the more efficient use of water by 
virtue of changing the place of use." 
The only trouble with the above quotation i8 that 
the applications do not seek to change the place of use. 
There is no requirement that respondents cease watering 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
any of the presently 'vaterlogged lands as a condition 
precedent to the applying of irrigation water on the 
5000 acres of ne'v lands. The acreage presently irriga-
ted by respondents totals approximately 14,000 acres, 
of 'vhich acreage they contend 10,000 are waterlogged. 
But they say that the way to cure the situation is to give 
them more water and they will actually use less. This 
Court can readily determine from its own experience 
concerning water and water rights that this is contrary 
to all human experience, for the reason that if a water 
user is ever awarded additional water, he will try in 
some manner to make use of it. 
This cannot be more clearly demonstated than in 
the present instance. The Morse Decree (Def. Ex. 51), 
placed all the primary rights from the Vermillion Dam 
near Richfield to the headwaters of the river in a single 
section and all the primary rights were pro-rated. In 
the discussions leading up to the signing of the stipula-
tion on which the Cox Decree is based the primary users 
in Piute and Garfield Counties convinced the primary 
users in Sevier County that if the users in Piute and 
Garfield Counties were no longer required to prorate 
with the primary users in Sevier County that the Sevier 
County users would actually receive a larger total 
quantity of water. The reason that since the users in 
Piute and Garfield Counties would get a much greater 
quantity of water during the summer months they would 
no longer use the large quantity of water in the n1onths 
of April and May when they had little, if any, use of the 
water and which 'vater would then go to the primary 
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users in Sevier County who could store this water in the 
Piute Reservoir and all would then be benefited. It was 
therefore stipulated between the parties that the pri-
. . . 
mary users in Piute and Garfield Counties would be 
placed in independent sections of .fhe river and were no 
longer required to prorate t~eir primary rights with 
the users in Sevier County. This stipulation was incor-
porated into the Cox Decree. The fact that the primary 
users then received a much greater quantity of water in 
the summer months did.not change their irrigation prac-
tices in the slightest (Trans. 1025). ·The result of this 
increased irrigation ~s: Jhat there are now 10,000 acres 
of waterlogged lands, none of which were waterlogged 
in 1925. (Def. Ex. 53). Once again respondents are ask-
ing the appellants and the co-qrt to grant them additional 
water and using the argument "give us more water and 
we will actually use l~ss.'.' From past experience 
respondents know that if they are given more water that 
they will use it regardless of the consequences; and 
knowing that. they cannot use more water on their 
present .lands without making a duck pond out of 1nost 
of it, they take the precaution of asking that they be 
permitted to us~ this additional water on 5000 acres of 
raw sagebrush land never before irrigated by then1 from 
their present water rights. 
2. POSSIBLE SAVINGS OF WATER BY DRAINAGE 
OF WATERLOGGED LANDS IS NOT PROPERLY IN ISSUE 
IN THIS CASE. 
If the respondents had filed 'vith the State Engineer 
an application such as that contemplated by Sec. 73~3-20, 
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U.C.A. 1953, to exchange certain of their waters, or by 
Sec. 73-3-23, U.C.A. 1953, for replacement of waters, and 
which type of applications are sometimes commonly 
called "'savings" applications under which they would 
propose to drain their m·eadow or so called waterlogge<l, 
lands, and claim the right to store and use the water thus 
saved then the fea~ibility of the project would be in-
quired into by the State Engineer, and these appellants 
would have the right to protelt such application if they 
felt their rights were in jeopardy or would be adversely 
affected. The respondents would, by such procedure, 
commit themselves to a definite program, not only as 
to the specified lands to be drained and the method and 
extent of the drainage, but would assert the amount of 
water which it was estimated could be saved; and upon 
approval of such application, if the project appeared to 
have merit, they would be required to complete tlie proj-
ect as set forth in their application, but would be limited 
to the amount of water thus saved. Upon the filing of 
such application, every lower user would have the oppor-
tuntiy to make adequate and proper investigation as to 
whether his vested rights would be adversely or injuri-
ously affected, and in event of a protest the State Engi-
neer, and later the court, would have this precise ques-
tion presented and determined. However, instead of 
proceeding in the proper manner, the respondents have 
chosen to make the claim, for the first time in the tria~ 
of this case, that they "could''-not "would"-drain their 
meadow lands and thus by elimination of evaporation, 
save considerable water. There was no such claim made, 
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or even intimated, in their change applications as filed 
'vith the State Engineer, or in the hearings before the 
State Engineer, or in their pleadings; and appellants 
were not afforded any reasonable opportunity to evalu-
ate the situation or meet the issue. It is quite significant 
that even in the trial of the cause, when respondents had 
Dr. Israelson testify to this matter of "drainage" and 
"evaporation," they very studiously avoided any cominit-
ments as to a p'resent intention to either initiate or conl-
plete such drainage program. It is significant also that 
the decree fails to require any saving of water. 
On page 55 of respondents brief, appellants are 
accused of misstating the acreage irrigated by respond-
ents. The claim is made that our figures are taken fron1 
infor1nation which is more than thirty years out of date. 
Our inforn1at.ion is taken fron1 respondents ov.rn appli-
cations No. a-2328, a-2329, a-2330, a-2331, a-233:2, n-:2~13:3, 
a-2334, a-2377, a-23'78, a-2379, a-2381, a-2382, a-2394, 
a-2395, a-2396, a-2407 and a-2408 which are the original 
ehange applications involved in this action and which 
'vere filed in the office of the State Engineer bet\veen 
Sept. 14, 1948, and Sept. 14, 1949, and which \\'ere cor-
rected on ~-,eb. 5, 1949. These applications are in evidenee 
before this Court as 1Jlaintiff's Exhibit 1. Re~pondent~ 
listed their acreage in detail and 've 1nerely took their 
figures for it, which, until sho\vn to the contrary, can he 
assumed to be correct. These applications reporh)dly 
list all of the lands then irrigated by respondents and 
total approxi1nately 14,000 acres. They say that we bnve 
contradicted this evidence by introducing Defendant~' 
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Ex. 54, which at page 11 thereof shows that the irrigated 
acreage in Garfield and Piute Counties aggregates about 
24,600 acres, and consequently appellants' evidence shows 
10,600 more acres of irrigated lands than is admitted in 
appellants' brief. What respondents fail to take into 
consideration is that the brief and page 11 of defendants' 
Ex. 54, are talking about two entirely different matters. 
In the brief is listed acreage presently irrigated by 
respondents. Page 11, Ex. 54, is talking of the total irri-
gated acreage in the two counties of Garfield and Piute. 
We are not at all concerned with the total acreage irri-
gated in the two counties. We are concerned only with 
the lands irrigated by respondents. 
On page 56 of their brief, respondents state: 
"It is significant that as a rule plaintiffs do 
not have allotted to them the full amount of their 
decreed primary rights because of insufficient 
flow of the river." 
It was stated on the same page of their brief: 
"When primary rights and second class 
rights are combined, the acreage "\vatered per sec-
ond foot cannot be said to show an excessive 
a\vard of water, nor to imply any duty to provide 
a 'substantial return flow' to the river." 
To substantiate this statement they cite the exam-
ples of the East Panguitch Irrigation Company, East 
Bench Irrigation Company and Long Canal Company. 
Let us see how this statement stands up against the 
record. Page 15, Defendants' Ex. 4 shows that for ten 
years out of fifteen years, between 1935 and 1950, these 
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companies received 100% of their primary flow for the 
entire season and that for those ten years they also 
received substantial quantities of water under their sec-
ond and third class rights. F·or the other five years they 
received not less than 90o/o-or more than 95% of their 
primary rights for the entire season, and that in addi-
tion, except for the years 1939 a~d 1950, they received 
a substantial quantity of water in addition from their 
second and third class rights. It will be ~bserved fron1 
page 15 of Ex. 4, that 1950 is the second driest year on 
record insofar as Panguitch Valley is concerned. 
The Long and East J3ench Canal Companies have 
a common diversion point and the combined acreage of 
the two companies amounts to 2460.5 acres. Page 54 of 
Plaintiff's Ex. 4 shows the daily diversion into the joint 
canal for the year 1950, which as stated before is the 
second driest year out of the fifteen year period next 
preceding. This record shows that there was diverted 
into this joint canal 17,190 acre feet of water for the 
irrigation of 2460.5 acres which amounts to 6.98 acre 
feet of water per acre, assuming that the entire acreage 
was irrigated that year. It is also significant to note 
that of this large quantity of water diverted, only 680 
acre feet of water were diverted during the entire 1nonths 
of January, February and December of that year. It 
will be noted also that approximately 0.9 of an acre foot 
of water per acre per month was diverted for each of 
the months of April, May, June, July, August and Octo-
ber, or a total of 5.4 acre feet during those months. ThiR 
is certainly a liberal supply of water during the growing 
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season and far more than any known plant could utilize. 
If the 13,000 acre feet which is proposed to be stored 
in respondents' reservoir were ~pplied to the lands 
presently being irrigated by respondent companies dur-
ing the 60-day period July 1st to August 31st, it would 
amount to 108 cubic feet per second for the 60 days or 
an additional one acre foot per acre. 
We assert that the usual, customary and normal duty 
of water throughout Utah, as recognized by the State 
Engineer in years past is three acre feet per acre for 
each irrigation ·season. There is no evidence in the rec-
ord sho,ving this fact but this Court has repeatedly held 
that the records of the State Engineer's O~fice are public 
records and it may, therefore, take judicial notice of the 
contents thereof. (McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 
201 P. 2nd 288; Lehigh Irrigation Company v. Jones, 
115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2nd 895; American Fork Irrigation 
Company v. Linke, (Utah 1951), 239 P. 2nd 189.) The 
records of the State Engineer's Office will show that 
unless some extraordinary condition exists, the certifi-
cates of appropriation he has in the past and now issues 
contain a limitation of three acre feet per acre per irri-
gation season, and that such amount is considered a 
reasonable duty. We mention this to show that in the 
year 1950, the second driest year in the 15-year period 
between 1935 and 1950, the canal companies in question 
received 6.98 acre feet of water per acre, or more water 
than twice the normal amount of what is considered a 
reasonable duty. 
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In numerous places in their brief (7, 20, 31, 46, and 
other places) ,respondents refer to "disaster" water. We 
assume they are referring to water which they cannot 
hold because of floods, broken canal banks and the like, 
and indicate that the respondents have no right to such 
water notwithstanding it all goes to make up the flow of 
the stream from time to time. They argue that notwith-
standing they have a right to prevent breaks in the 
canals and to put controls in the channel to prevent 
flooding of their lands and thus prevent such "disaster" 
water from reaching the reservoirs, they have a vested 
right to such waters to the extent of storing the same 
even though their award was a direct flow right. At the 
time the decree was written, it was certainly known by 
all par~ies that there would be such things as flash 
floods, flooding of lands after cloudbursts, broken canal 
banks, rain storms when water from the river would 
not be needed; and in the light of such conditions no 
right was asked for, by, or awarded to the respondent~' 
to store such waters for future use, but the storage 
companies were awarded all waters not used by primary 
direct flow users 
Respondents cite the case of 81nithjield West 
Bench Irr. Co. vs. Union Ce·ntral Life In-s. Co., 105 
Utah 468, 142 Pac. 2nd 866, (see page 140 respondents' 
brief) as authority for their position that the granting 
of all their applications as set forth in the Jones <lecree 
is no enlargement of their rights. They assert "The 
case also holds that the appropriator may also put his 
appropriated water into a reservoir, or lease or sell the 
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water.'" We submit that the case does not uphold such 
assertion insofar as the same 'vould apply to the case 
at bar. The only statement in the opinion in that matter 
is found at page 867 of 142 Pac. 2nd, where it is said: 
HAs long as 'vater is under control of appro-
priator o·n .. his land or in hi.s ditches or reservoirs 
owned or controlled by him it is still his water 
and he n1ay use it in any lawful place or for any 
la,vful use he chooses, or may lease it or sell it." 
This statement is made in the light of the factual 
situation then before the court. The court said: 
"The nub of the controversy is-has either 
party shown it has a right as against the other 
to the use of the water coming through Logan 
Korthern Canal, and what rights can be acquired 
in such water." 
There is no discussion in the Smithfield case as to 
any different type or kind of irrigation, or at a period 
of time other than that for which the water was awarded, 
or change from direct flow to storage, nor was there 
before the court or considered, the statutory provision 
that a change such as respondents are making must be 
under change applications and under a showing that the 
change can be effected without injury or impairing the 
rights of others. 
At page 138 of respondents' brief, it is argued that 
an application to convert a portion of a direct flow right 
to a storage right does not constitute an enlargement of 
the right, for it does not amount to an application to 
appropriate more water. Under certain circumstances 
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that may be true. But not under the circumstances 
attendant in the instant cause, where respondents want 
to store a part of their direct flow winter rights, not 
needed or used in the winter months, to irrigate 5,000 
additional acres in the summer, and to continue to use 
their summer rights to irrigate all of their previously 
irrigated lands. Respondents cite as authority for their 
claimed right the case of Gunnison Irr. Co. vs. Gunnison 
Highland Canal Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852. Tllis 
case is in reality authority for the .appellants' position. 
A reading of the case shows that respondents did not 
quote fully fro1n the· opinion. They did not finish the 
quotation referred to in their brief, and which balance 
of the quotation is as follows: 
"But it is well settled and entirely elernentary 
that all changes in the 1node of enjoyn1ent n1ust 
in no event Yiolate the 1naxiln 'Sic utere tuo ut 
alienu1n non laedas'. That qualification is plainly 
set forth in Seven Lakes Res. vs Ne'v Loveland 
& Greeley Irr. and Land Co., cited supra, wherP 
at page 486 of 93 f>ac. and page 331 of 17 L.H.A. 
(N.S.) Gabbert, J., in delivering the opinion of 
the court said : 'A Priority to the use of water is 
a property right, 'vhich is subject to purchase and 
sale and its character and method of use 1nay ht:> 
changed, provided such change does not injuri-
ously affect the rights of others. (Italics set forth 
in opinion.) 
On page 855 of 17 4 Pac. ( Chtnnison case above 
referred to), it is said : 
"In short the rights of a prior appropriator 
are 1neasured and li1nited to the extent of hi~ 
appropriation and application to a henefieinl use. 
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If he diverts 1nore water than under this doctrine 
he is entitled to, he must return such surplus to 
the strerun for the use of subsequent appropri-
ators. No extension or enlargement of his ·rights 
as determined by the doctrine of beneficial use 
can be n1ade so as to interfere with the vested 
rights of others." 
In the Seven Lakes case, cited above, 93 Pac. at 
page 487, appears the following statement in addition to 
the quotation which appears in respondents' brief. It is 
pertinent to the problem in the case at bar. 
"It is contended by counsel that the decision 
in this case is contrary to New Loveland & 
Greeley I. & .L. Co. vs Consolidated Home Supply 
Ditch Co. 62 Pac. 366, 52 L.R.A. 266, and Fort 
Lyon Canal Co. vs Chew, 81 Pac. 37. In the New 
Loveland ease it 'vas determined that the appro-
priation of water for irrigation of lands during 
the irrigation season gave the appropriator no 
priority of right to store water during the non-
irrigating season for future use. This does not 
conflict with the opinion in case at bar. No right 
to store water during the non-irrigating season 
is conferred." ( E1nphasis added.) 
The Seven Lakes case relied on by respondents can 
readily be distinguished from the case at bar, both in 
fact and in legal principle involved. In the Seven Lakes 
case the appellant owned certain rights to the use of 
water which had previously been applied to the irriga-
tion of lands. Instead of continuing to so use this water 
it ceased its direct application in the early part of the 
irrigation season and stored the water for use later 
in the same irrigation season, but storage did not involve 
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winter water, nor storage at any time other than that 
when water was previously applied by direct diversion 
from the stream. On the rehearing the court said: (page 
487, 93 Pac.) 
"It must be borne in mind that this decision 
is based upon the fact, which is undisputed, that 
the stockholders of appellant are gro,ving crops 
which do not, from their nature, require irriga-
tion during the early part of the season, but do 
later, and that they desire to utilize the water in 
controversy for that purpose. Based upon these 
facts we have declared what has tin1e and tilne 
again been decided by this court, that the charac-
ter and method of use of a priority to the use of 
water may be changed, provided such change does 
not injuriously affect the rights of others, and 
that appellant is entitled to divert and store the 
water represented by the priorities purchased 
for the use of its stockholders for application to 
crops later, but in no greater quantity anrl at uo 
other or different time than could be di,t·erted 
and applied to land directly to nourish l'TO}JS 
t~equiring irriga.tion at the time of such diversion; 
or otherwise expressed, appellant is per1nitted to 
divert and store the water in controversy, but 
this right is measured and fixed by the liinita-
tions which the law would i1npose upon its usc for 
diversion and application to crops requiring irri-
gation at the time of such diversion. ****** This 
does not enlarge the use of the priorities of apel-
lant, either in .time or quantity; neither does it 
confer upon it the right to divert and store the 
water represented by its prioritie~ every day 
during the irrigation season or to convert such 
priorities into a storage right during the non-
irrigating season, but lin1its its rights strictly to 
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the diversion of water, both as to volume and 
time, to the same quantity and the same time we 
have indicated." 
\V e think the case of New Lovelarnd and Greeley 
Irr-igation and Land' Co. vs. Consolidated Home-Supply 
Ditch and Res. Co., 62 Pac. 366, (Colo.) is almost directly 
in point \\Tith the problen1 no\v under discussion. The facts 
in the above case are these: The plaintiff was awarded 
a priority of right senior to that awarded the defend-
ants who use ditches as· a feeder for its reservoirs. The 
plaintiff's right \vas predicated upon a direct flow or 
ditch right, \\Thich it afterwards wanted to convert into 
a storage right. Plaintiff urged that its appropriations 
and for which it received its decreed priority were 
appropriations made for agricultural purposes, regard-
less of the Inethod or the time of use; that is to say, 
plaintiff claimed the right to employ its decreed appro-
priations in the most effective and economical manner, 
either by i1nmediate use in the irrigation of lands or 
by storage of water during the non-irrigating season 
and at other times when water is to be obtained froin 
the river, to be used by it thereafter during the irriga-
ting season. (This is precisely what the appellants are 
now contending for). On the other hand the defendant 
con tended that under the statutes of the state, as well 
as the general law relating to the subject of appropri-
ation, the right of storing water in reservoirs is one 
thing and the right of diverting water for immediate use 
in irrigating lands is another and distinct thing, and 
neither necessarily depends upon or is connected with 
the other. 
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The CQurt said (page 367, 62 Pac.): 
"Much discussion is indulged in by counsel 
over the terms 'dir~ct' and 'indireet' irrigation, 
plaintiff maintaining that in the system of irri-
gation law there is no valid difference while 
defendant dwells with some force upon ·a dis-
tinction supposed to exist between the two meth-
ods of use and the law applicable. *••••• (Quot-
ing from the concluding sentence of the opinion) 
-while the statutes of this state contemplate that 
one may, by complying with their provisions, 
acquire and have decreed to him a priority of 
right for storing water in reservoirs, it is also 
clearly their design that this right shall not be 
dependent upon, or measured by a right which he 
may have to a decree for his ditch of a priority 
for diverting water for immediate irrigation, tho 
the ditch may, in addition to being used as ave-
hicle for carrying water for :llruuediate use, be also 
utilized at some· time as a feeder for the reser-
voir." 
Respondents assert in their brief on page 140 "This 
court has also approved the practice of 'vinter irriga-
tion, not only in Richlands Irr. Co. vs. Westview Irr. 
Co., et al., 96 Utah 403, 80 Pac. 2nd, 458, but also in 
Lawson vs. McBride, 71 Utah 239, 264 Pac. 727." In the 
Lawson case cited above nothing is said about 'vinter 
water, but the opinion states that during the highwater 
season water may be used to soak up ground. 
As to the use of winter water, the correct rule, we 
believe, is that set forth in the case of Hardy vs. Beaver 
County Irrigation Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 Pac. 524, at page 
529 ( 4), to the effect that an appropriation of 'vater is 
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limited by time as well as by amount; in other words, 
that an appropriator's right is limited by the quantity of 
water which he has beneficially used and the seasonal 
period during which he has used the same. The Hardy 
case· holds that an appropriator's right must be limited 
to the ainount of water he can use beneficially during 
the period of the year when he has actually been accus-
tomed to use the same. 
3. THE QUANTITY OF WATER BEING TAKEN FROM 
APPELLANTS IS LARGE IN AMOUNT AND APPELLANTS 
WILL BE SERIOUSLY HURT BY SUCH TAKING. 
Respondents contend also that they should be per- . 
mitted to construct a reservoir and impound the waters 
therein upon the ground that the amount proposed to be 
stored is so small in relation to the total storage on the 
Sevier River, that no one can possibly be harmed. This 
contention is made at pages 10 and 25 of their brief. 
In effect they state you can destroy a 1nan without injur-
ing him if you do it a little at a time. Their statement 
is correct that the storage capacity of the reservoir at 
Hatch would only equal 4.5·% of the available storage 
capacity in the Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs, but 
the statement is greatly misleading, for it is not the 
capacity of the reservoir that is imp·ortant, but the 
amount of water actually available for storage therein. 
It is clearly shown by the record covering a long period 
of tin1e (Deft's Ex. 4, page 25) and by the testimony of 
W. C. Cole (trans. page 489), that the average amount of 
water impounded in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir an-
nually from the period 1915 to · 1950 is only approxi-
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mately 160,000 acre feet and that the water proposed to 
be stored in the Hatchtown Reservoir is approximately 
8.75% of the annual storage of the. Sevier Bridge Reser-
voir. D·efendant's Ex. 4, on page 25 also shows that for 
the year 1935 the water proposed to be stored in Hatch-
town Reservoir would approximate 33¥3% of the total 
amount of water stored in the Piute and the Sevier 
Bridge Reservoirs combined. The only correct com-
parison is not in capacity of the respective reservoirs 
but in the available water for storage therein. The rec-
ord (Pltf's Ex. G) shows that there is always sufficient 
water at Kingston to fill the proposed reservoir. The 
record therefore discloses that if the proposed reservoir 
were allowed to be constructed and water stored therein 
which has otherwise been stored in the Piute Reservoir, 
that in an average year it would deprive the lower users 
of a substantial amount of the water 'vhich they have 
been otherwise receiving, and in the dry years such a.s 
1935, of an amount equal to approximately one third of 
the available water. But this would not be the only 
result, since there are numerous other reservoir sites 
along the Sevier River above the Piute Reservoir at 
which sites reservoirs could be constructed and 'vater 
impounded therein to the extent of depriving the owners 
of the Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs of practically 
all of the water which is now impounded therein. (R. 
1110; see page 63 of appellants' opening brief). 
Reference is made in respondents' brief (page 90) 
to a provision in the Cox Decree at page 11 giving to 
Panguitch Land and Livestock Company "sufficient of 
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the waters on the South Fork of the Sevier River to fill 
its reservoir as the same is to be constructed near Asay, 
Garfield County, according to present plans and speci-
fication." Respondents then argue that because of such 
a'vard the Cox Decree clearly contemplated the con.struc-
tion in the future of a reservoir, and therefore it follows 
that this decree gives respondents the right to store their 
direct flow rights in a reservoir at the approximate site 
of the reservoir above mentioned. 
As stated by respondents "the question of storage 
under said fourth class rights is not in issue here." Just 
why the award appears in the Cox Decree is not clear. 
It was agreed between counsel, and submitted to the 
trial court, that plaintiffs did not claim any rights under 
that award. 
Quoting from page 5 of the Record (Reporter's 
Transcript) : 
"THE COURT: You're not asking for any 
rights under that particular paragraph in the 
Cox Decree which says a right to construct a 
reservoir in Asay Canyon; you're not relying on 
that~ 
MR. BUR.TON: That isn't in these applica-
tions at all. 
MR. CLINE : Is it in this suit~ 
MR. BURTON: No." 
As a matter of fact one of the 'vitnesses, Nels L. 
Peterson, testified that this award was permitted to get 
into the decree because the Piute Reservoir owners were 
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under the impression that the rights belonged to Piute, 
and if Piute was to construct the reservoir then Sevier 
Bridge would be mutually interested ·and it 1night be an 
advantage to Sevier Bridge and Piute to store part of 
their water in such reservoir and let it down as needed. 
( R. 855 to 858). Because it was agreed the plaintiff~ 
would claim no rights under that award the defendant~ 
did not introduce any evidence showing how the Pan-
guitch Land and Irrigation Company right \Vas initiated, 
whether it had lapsed, what was done with it, of \Vhat 
the fourth class right might consist and \vhether the 
right was a consu1nptive or non-consumptive use. Futher-
more, respondents are not the successors to any suc.h 
rights and there is not privity between respondents and 
Panguitch Land & Irr. Co. It seen1s idle for the respo~d­
ents to urge that they haYe acquired the right to ~tore 
their direct flo\v prin1ary rights because the Cox Decree 
provided for storage of some fourth class rights. The 
award to the Panguitch Land and Livestock Con1pany i~ 
completely foreign to the issues in the case at har, and 
neither adds nor detracts fron1 the position of Pither 
respondents or appellants. We mention the matter only 
because respondents stress the fact that by this award 
there is an implication in the decree looking for\vard to 
the time when they should likewise have the right to 
build a reservoir and convert their direct flow \vinter 
rights into storage for either the follo\ving irrigation 
season, or for that n1atter, to be held over until a year 
later. 
'Ve call attention to thP faet that the applications for 
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such storage do not require a release of the stored water 
during the following irrigation season, but respondents 
could hold over a portion until a second or third irriga-
tion season. The decree does not require the respondents 
to release the entire amount of storage in any one year. 
It should be borne in mind that even if water was 
stored under the Panguitch Land and Livestock Com-
pany right as set forth in the decree, and assuming such 
storage deprived the lower storage companies of a sub-
stantial quantity of water, such use would have com-
menced many years ago and before the water users 
taking water from storage had invested large sums in 
developing farms, building homes thereon and other-
wise making expensive improvements in reliance of 
sufficient water for such purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Those members of the Court who visited the Millard 
County and Sevier and Sanpete Valley areas must 
appreciate the disastrous ·effect that the irrigation of 
5,000 acres in Panguitch Valley would have upon the 
lower users. They observed that all of the waters of the 
river are being consumed for agricultural purposes and 
they were able to see for themselves that this is not a 
case where there are excess waters which would other-
wise be wasted. The thousands of acres in Millard 
County and under the Piute project which many years 
ago had been cleared and farmed and then abandoned 
for lack of water are the best evidence of the disaster 
'vhich would fall to the appellant companies if the 
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respondents succeed in this proceeding. The respond-
ents' attempt to appropriate additional water never 
before needed or ·used by them is an obvious invasion of 
the vested rights of the appellants. For 17 years under 
the General Adjudication Decree the River Commis-
sioners have adn1inistered the water of the Sevier Ri Yer 
in an efficient, careful and fair manner with the result 
that all of the waters of the river have been placed to 
a beneficial use and homes and farms have been estab-
lished relying upon the delivery of such water. For more 
than 17 years under this administration there has been 
quiet and peace on the river because all parties fully 
understood the stipulation and its purposes upon which 
the General Adjudication Decree was based. Respond-
ents justify their atten1pt to utilize storage in the pro-
posed Hatchtown Reservoir because of what they eall 
"progress." If this Court was concerned only 'vith 
progress for the benefit of respondents, the position of 
respondents might be sustained.· Ho,vever, respondent~ 
are not entitled to progress solely at the expense of and 
without regard to the rights of the lower users. 
The State Engineer's decision in rejecting the respond-
ents' applications should be reinstated and the decree of 
the Trial Court reversed. 
"Respectfully subrnitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General 
JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ROBERT B. PORTER, 
Assistant Attorney General 
(Attorneys for State Engineer) 
NEPHI J. BATES, 
C. W. WILKINS, 
RICHARD H. NEBEKER, 




(Attorneys for Deseret Irrigation 
Company, Melville Irrigation Co., 
Delta Canal Co., Central Utah 
Water Company and Abraham Irri-
gation Company) 
FERDINAND ERICKSON, 
C. W. WILKINS, 
(Attorneys for Richfield Irrigation 
and Canal Company, Annabella Ir-
rigation Canal Company, Elsinore 
Canal Company, Brooklyn ·Canal 
Company, Monroe Irrigation Com-
pany, Wells Irrigation Company, 
Joseph Irrigation Company, Se-
vier Valley Canal Company, Ver-
million Irrigation Company, and 
Monroe South Bend Canal Com-
pany) 
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